The breakdown of amnesia was examined by showing subjects a videotape of the hypnotic events that they had experienced. The extent of the amnesia for these events was defined precisely, and simulating procedures were employed to analyze the cues existing in the overall test situation. Videotape display of the hypnotic events was presented via application of the Experiential Analysis Technique and served to optimize conditions for breakdown. Results demonstrated that some hypnotic subjects' amnesia cannot be broken down even when they are exposed via videotape playback to the events to be recalled and when suggestions for the period of amnesia are quite explicit. Simulators showed breaching of amnesia but attributed their recall to the videotape rather than to the hypnotic session. Hypnotic subjects were distinctive in their inability to recall experiential aspects of their performance even though they could recall behavioral aspects. Alternative interpretations of the data are discussed in relation to the hypothesis that dissociative cognitive mechanisms underlie posthypnotic amnesia.
Posthypnotic amnesia refers to subjects' apparent inability to recall hypnotic events following a suggestion that they will not remember those events when awakened from hypnosis. After the presentation of a reversibility cue for the cancellation of the suggestion, however, subjects recall the events. As a core phenomenon of hypnosis, posthypnotic amnesia has been the focus of considerable empirical and theoretical analysis (for reviews, see Coe, 1978; Cooper, 1979; Evans, 1980; Kihlstrom, 1978; Kihlstrom & Evans, 1979) . Irrespective of the particular theoretical position adopted, however, no one account appears to explain all of the paradoxes and complexities associated with the phenomenon (Kihlstrom, 1978; Sarbin & Coe, 1979) , and substantial investigation of many of its aspects is still needed.
One line of research that promises to provide important evidence is the attempt to break down, or breach, posthypnotic amnesia prior to its reversal. Studies adopting this method of inquiry (e.g., Bowers, 1966; Howard & Coe, 1980; Kihlstrom, Evans, Orne, & Orne, 1980; McConkey, Sheehan, & Cross, 1980; Schuyler & Coe, in press) appear to indicate that amnesia can be broken down for some, but not all, subjects. Studies have varied substantially, however, in the degree of demand for breakdown that they have provided. Bowers (1966) employed an independent experimenter and demands for honesty to test the amnesia response of hypnotic and role-playing subjects and reported that all of the role-playing and approximately half of the hypnotic subjects breached their amnesia. Kihlstrom et al. (1980) requested subjects to recall either routinely, by listing the items chronologically, or by exerting more effort or reporting honestly on a second test of the amnesia item of the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A (HGSHSIA; Shor & Orne, 1962) ; their findings indicated that approximately half of the subjects in each group showed increased recall. Howard and Coe (1980) and Schuyler and Coe (in press) employed subjects who had previously displayed amnesia and tested them under instructional conditions of either high, medium, or low demands for amnesia breakdown; results indicated that those subjects who felt in control of their recall during the previous amnesia testing breached, but other subjects did not. Across these studies the specific test conditions employed had little differential impact on the amnesia performance of subjects; individual differences in hypnotizability and previous amnesia performance were far more important factors in determining the outcome of attempts to break down the amnesia. McConkey et al. (1980) placed the most stringent demands on subjects to breach their amnesia by showing them a videotape of their hypnotic session prior to the administration of the reversibility cue. Specifically, the study involved an application of the Experiential Analysis Technique (EAT; Sheehan, McConkey, & Cross, 1978) , which is a technique developed to facilitate and inquire into subjects' retrospective recall of hypnotic events. It presents subjects with a videotape record of the actual events of their hypnotic session and was used to actively promote the breakdown of amnesia. The presentation of a videotape playback of the hypnotic events could be said to serve, in a sense, as a variant of recognition testing for subjects' memories of the hypnotic events in which the number of times subjects stop to comment on their recall of the hypnotic events can be taken as an approximate index of their recognition memory (see Kihlstrom & Shor, 1978; and Williamsen, Johnson, & Eriksen, 1965 ; for a discussion of recognition memory during posthypnotic amnesia). The findings of McConkey et al. (1980) indicated that almost half of the initially amnesic subjects maintained their amnesia response after viewing (on videotape) the events as they had taken place. Close inspection of the data, however, indicated that some subjects may have perceived the amnesia suggestion as extending over the total session; that is, the procedures for breaching amnesia may not have affected subjects in a uniform or consistent manner. The present study specifically addressed this issue of possible cue ambiguity by modifying the amnesia instruction so as to specify precisely the period of the suggestion. The present study also employed a simulation condition (Orne, 1959 (Orne, , 1971 in order to assess the cue demands carried by the suggestion and to refine interpretation of real subjects' hypnotic performance.
An additional focus of the present study related to the finding of previous research (McConkey et al., 1980 ) that some amnesic subjects claimed they could remember their hypnotic behavior but not the experiences that accompanied that behavior. Specifically, some amnesic subjects commented on their being able to recall the physical events being shown them via the videotape but not being able to recall the experiences accompanying those hypnotic events; whereas viewing the videotape appeared to facilitate recall of behavioral aspects of hypnosis, it did not facilitate recall of covert, subjective aspects. Given that only behavior is shown by the videotape, however, the distinction between behavioral and experiential recall may well reflect the cue demands inherent in the test situation and needs to be validated. The performance of simulators can be assumed to provide an index of whether the differentiation of behavioral and experiential memories may be explained on the basis of cue demands.
In summary, the present study was an attempt to specifically validate and extend the findings of McConkey et al, (1980) relating to the durability of posthypnotic amnesia. The EAT was used to optimize the breaching of amnesia and thus provide an especially stringent test of its durability. Suggestion exactly specified the amnesia period, and simulating subjects were included in the design to provide an objective, behavioral index of the cue demands of the experimental situation.
Method Subjects
Twenty-four (19 female and 5 male) real hypnotic subjects (mean age 22.92 years, SD = 6.32) and 24 (11 female and 13 male) simulating, nonhypnotic subjects (mean age 27.50 years, SD = 11.13) who were undergraduate psychology students at the University of Queensland voluntarily participated in the study. Subjects were selected on the basis of their performance on the !2-item HGSHS:A; the mean HGSHS:A score for hypnotic subjects was 9.58 (SD = 1.14) and for simulating subjects was 1.79 (SD = 1.18).
Procedure
Three experimenters participated in the study. The first experimenter instructed the hypnotic and simulating subjects, the second experimenter (the hypnotist) conducted the hypnotic testing, and the third experimenter (the inquirer) conducted the EAT inquiry session following hypnosis.
Initially, hypnotic subjects were told that they would be tested by a hypnotist and then another person would discuss their experiences of hypnosis with them; no instructions were given to real hypnotic subjects as to the type of behavior they should display or the type of experiences they should report. Simulating subjects, on the other hand, were instructed specifically to pretend that they were excellent hypnotic subjects. The instructions employed were based on those recommended by Orne (1959 Orne ( , 1971 , with the important addition that subjects were informed that, as well as being tested by a hypnotist, they would be asked to discuss their hypnotic experiences with a third person whom they were also to fool into thinking that they experienced deep hypnosis during their session with the hypnotist.
The hypnotist was blind to subjects' hypnotic or simulating identity and informed them that they would be administered a hypnotic scale and would then discuss their experiences with another person. Subjects were informed that the hypnotic session would be videotaped but were not told that they would view these events later. Subjects were then instructed to close their eyes, were administered a standard hypnotic induction and tested on a range of hypnotic tasks (hand lowering, arm immobilization, age regression, glove analgesia, missing number, hallucination, and missing watch hand; since the glove analgesia and hallucination items included nonroutine aspects, the hypnotic score obtained by subjects was based on the remaining five items), and were finally administered the suggestion for posthypnotic amnesia. The posthypnotic amnesia suggestion was similar to that employed in previous research (see McConkey et al., 1980) , with the important modification that instructions communicated explicitly the limits of the suggestion in order to test whether the maintenance of amnesia for some hypnotic subjects was an artifact of the context of suggestion defined in the previous study. The verbatim suggestion was as follows (aspects designed to limit the framework of the suggestion are italicized):
You are deeply relaxed and deeply hypnotized. Listen carefully to what I am going to tell you next. Something very interesting is going to happen. In a moment I am going to count backwards from 10 to 1. As I do you will awaken gradually, but you will still be in your present state for most of the count. When you wake up you will have trouble recalling the things I have said to you since I asked you to close your eyes at the beginning of the session. You will have trouble recalling the things you have experienced in this period from the beginning of the session until waking up. In fact you will prefer not to try to recall any of these things that have happened in the time we have spent together here; it will be much easier just to forget everything that has gone on. In a moment I will get you to open your eyes, slowly and gently, remaining deeply hypnotized, and when you do you will see my set of keys. Just open your eyes and listen carefully (hypnotist holds keys in front of subject). You will forget all that has happened from when I asked you to close your eyes until when you open your eyes and wake up, you will forget all that happened in the time we have spent together until I show you this set of keys again and say to you, 'Now you can remember everything.' Now just close your eyes. No matter what happens you will forget everything that has happened during this time we have spent together until you see my set of keys again, even if I leave the room and somebody else asks you what happened, you will not be able to remember anything that happened during the session, all memory of what we did together will be gone. You will forget everything of what happened during hypnosis until I show you my set of keys and tell you that you can remember, you will remember nothing until I say this to you when I return. I will now count backwards from 10 to 1, at 3 you will open your eyes and at 1 you will be wide awake in your normal state of alertness. Ready now, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. How do you feel?
The hypnotist then conducted the initial recall test by requesting subjects to report everything that had happened since they closed their eyes at the beginning of the session. The hypnotist kept requesting information from subjects until they indicated that they could not recall or report any more events.
EA T session. Following this recall test, the inquirer (who was blind to both subjects' identity and their amnesia status) conducted the EAT session. The procedure of the EAT involves having subjects view a videotape of their hypnotic testing in the presence of an independent person who fosters subjects' comments about their experiences; details of the procedure are provided by Sheehan et al. (1978) . The inquirer informed subjects that the videotape of their hypnotic performance would be played and that their viewing of it would assist their recall. Subjects were told to stop the videotape and describe their experiences whenever they recalled anything. When subjects stopped the videotape, the inquirer explored the nature of their experiences by requesting comment on, for instance, their images and cognitions at the time. At the end of the videotape playback, the inquirer asked subjects about their overall perceptions of the hypnotic session and their recall of events, and rated them as either real or simulating.
Following the EAT session, the hypnotist returned and gave subjects a second recall test, following which amnesia was cancelled. Finally, the hypnotist questioned subjects about the impact that the viewing of the videotape had on their recall and also rated them as either real or simulating.
Results
The study yielded data relating both -to subjects' actual recall performance and to their subjective reports about recall. Actual recall data are the numbers of items remembered prior to (i.e., initial recall) and following (i.e., second recall) the viewing of the videotape. Also, the numbers of stops subjects made while viewing the videotape approximate recognition testing data. Subjective report data are subjects' comments concerning their memories during the viewing of the videotape. These two kinds of data will be considered in turn. Table 1 presents the mean number of events recalled by subjects on the recall tests prior to and following the viewing of the videotape. Subjects who reported no more than two of the nine hypnotic events (i.e., hypnotic induction, seven hypnotic items, and posthypnotic amnesia item) that occurred between eye closure and awakening were classified as amnesic, and subjects who reported more than two events were classified as nonamnesic. By definition, amnesic subjects recalled appreciably fewer events than nonamnesic subjects on the initial recall test; a comparison of the susceptibility test scores of hypnotic amnesic (M = 4.00, SD -.73) and nonamnesic (M = 3.50, SD = 1.07) subjects indicated no appreciable difference in overall hypnotic responsiveness.
Recall Data
On the recall test following the viewing of the videotape, hypnotic amnesic subjects still recalled significantly fewer events, t(22) = 2.85, p < .01, than did nonamnesic subjects. The viewing of the videotape did not break down the initial difference in recall between hypnotic amnesic and nonamnesic subjects. Further, the viewing of the videotape did not differentially affect the recall of hypnotic and simulating amnesic subjects. This finding indicates that cues for sustain- Note. Maximum number of events to be recalled was 9.
ing amnesia were present in the test situation.
One aim of the present study was to determine whether an ambiguity in the instructions employed in the study by McConkey et al. (1980) led hypnotic amnesic subjects to maintain their amnesia performance following the viewing of the videotape. An amnesia instruction that specified more closely the period of amnesia was used in the present study in order to test this possibility. A comparison of the number of events recalled following the viewing of the videotape by hypnotic amnesic subjects (M = 2.64, SD = 2.21) in the study by McConkey et al. (1980) and by hypnotic amnesic subjects (M = 3.63, SD = 2.75) in the present study indicated no appreciable difference. That is, even when the period of amnesia was specified in quite precise fashion, the overall recall of hypnotic amnesic subjects was relatively low. The findings of McConkey et al, (1980) in this regard, then, cannot be said to be based on the ambiguity of the amnesia instruction that was employed.
The number of subjects whose amnesic response did or did not break down on the second recall test is presented in Table 2 . Application of the criterion for amnesia (recall of no more than two events) to the recall test following the viewing of the videotape indicated that similar proportions of hyp-notic and simulating subjects breached their amnesia. In terms of hypnotic responsiveness, those hypnotic subjects whose amnesia broke down (M = 3.80, SD = .79) did not differ appreciably from those whose amnesia did not break down (M = 4.33, SD = .52).
In the study, the hypnotist classified correctly the real or simulating identity of 58.33% of the subjects who were tested; the inquirer classified correctly 70.83% of the subjects. The classification of subjects by the hypnotist was unrelated, however, to whether or not subjects breached their amndsia. The higher detection of subjects' identities by the inquirer very likely reflects the differential comments by real and simulating subjects concerning their subjective experiences, whereas the hypnotist's ratings of identity are based largely on their objective performance.
Although similar proportions of real hypnotic subjects and simulators broke down their amnesic performance following the EAT, differences in their attribution of recall were evident. Whereas 14 (87.50%) of the simulating subjects who demonstrated breaching of amnesia maintained that they recalled the events from their viewing of the videotape and not from the hypnotic session, no hypnotic amnesic subject made this distinction; this difference between hypnotic and simulating subjects was significant, Note. Maximum number of events to be recalled was 9. X 2 ( 1) = 15.60, p < .01. Simulators attributed their recall to the videotape by claiming that they were reporting the hypnotic events on the basis of their recall for the events as they were shown on the videotape and could still not recall the events as they actually occurred during hypnosis. Despite their behavioral performance, then, simulators preserved their amnesic status by attributing their recall of hypnotic events to the viewing of the videotape. Although no hypnotic subjects attributed their recall in this way, some did indicate that, on some of the events that they were recalling, they were unsure whether they were recalling only from the hypnotic session or whether their recall was more from the viewing of the events on tape.
The number of times subjects stopped the videotape to comment during the EAT session provided an approximate measure of subjects' recognition of the hypnotic events that they were viewing. Hypnotic amnesic subjects stopped the videotape a mean number of 9.56 (SD = 6.74) times, hypnotic nonamnesic subjects stopped the videotape a mean number of 14.00 (SD = 7.76) times, and simulating amnesic subjects stopped the videotape a mean number of 4.75 (SD = 3.98) times. Analysis indicated that hypnotic amnesic and nonamnesic subjects did not differ appreciably in the number of times they stopped the videotape but that hypnotic amnesic subjects stopped the videotape significantly more than did simulating amnesic subjects, f(38) = 2.02, p < .05. In this regard, it is important to note that although hypnotic amnesic and nonamnesic subjects did not differ appreciably in terms of the number of times that they stopped the videotape, they did make quite different comments while the videotape was stopped; whereas amnesic subjects generally reported their difficulties in recalling the material that they were viewing, nonamnesic subjects commented openly on the nature of their hypnotic experiences. The performance of simulators suggests that the cues of the situation were to stop the tape relatively infrequently during the viewing of the videotape.
We turn now to data based on subjects' comments during the EAT. These data highlight relevant aspects of subjects' experience and facilitate a more complete understanding of the phenomenal events that occurred in the study.
Report Data
The comments of hypnotic amnesic subjects during the EAT session differed markedly from those of hypnotic nonamnesic and simulating amnesic subjects. Hypnotic amnesic subjects generally expressed an inability to recall the events being viewed. Characteristic of nonamnesic subjects was the view expressed by the subject who reported, "there were some details I had forgotten but having seen it on the screen it brought back everything." Simulating amnesic subjects, on the other hand, generally indicated that they could not remember the events and made little comment on either their reported recall difficulty or the nature of any material that they reported they could recall.
In terms of the distinction between memories of behavior and experience reported by McConkey et al. (1980) , five (31.25%) hypnotic, but no simulating, amnesic subjects indicated that they were sometimes able to recall aspects of their hypnotic performance but not the experiences that accompanied those events; this difference between hypnotic and simulating subjects was significant, x 2 ( 1) = 5.79, p < .05. This finding suggests that the distinction between behavioral and experiential memories is not based in the cue demands of the setting as indexed by the behavior of simulators. No simulators performed like hypnotic amnesic subjects in commenting (for instance), "I can sort of remember this, but I can't remember the experience . . . I can remember (the hypnotist) doing it but I can't remember how it felt." Two independent raters, blind to subjects' hypnotic or simulating identity, judged the comments subjects made about their recall during their viewing of the videotape in terms of this distinction between memories of behavior and experience. Rater 1 judged 5 hypnotic amnesic and no simulating subjects, and Rater 2 judged 9 hypnotic amnesic and no simulating subjects to make this distinction; inspection of the confidence levels Rater 2 attached to her judgments indicated that 5 of the 6 subjects that she was confident about were those selected by Rater 1; that is, for those judgments that raters were confident about, they agreed in 95.83% (z = 4.60, p < .01) and 100.00% (z = 5.00, p < .01) of cases for hypnotic and simulating subjects, respectively, and these levels of agreement are significantly above those expected by chance.
Discussion
The present study replicated and extended previous findings that the amnesia of some hypnotic subjects cannot be broken down by their viewing of actual hypnotic events. The major findings of the present study concern the facts that the previous finding cannot be attributed to an ambiguity concerning the period of amnesia, there is a differential attribution of recall by hypnotic and simulating amnesic subjects, and a distinction can be made between behavioral and experiential memories. In discussing these issues, it is important to consider carefully the implications of the comparisons between real and simulating performance, whether the procedures used in the present study actually breached amnesia, and whether the subjective reports obtained from subjects during the viewing of the videotape reflect cognitive mechanisms associated with their posthypnotic amnesia.
Across comparisons of the performance of hypnotic and simulating subjects, it is apparent that simulating subjects were much more homogeneous in their performance than were hypnotic subjects; this is consistent with previous data (see Sheehan, 1973) . Also, these comparisons highlighted the fact that although simulating subjects can perform in similar behavioral fashion to hypnotic subjects, they can be reliably distinguished from them on the basis of experiential criteria.
In terms of the attribution of the source of recall by subjects who recalled more following the viewing of the videotape, simulators indicated that their recall was based on their viewing of the videotape and not on the hypnotic testing. Recalling the events of the videotape was not the same as recalling the events of hypnosis, and it is important to note that subjects in the study had been uniformly instructed not to recall the hypnotic events. In this sense, although simulators appeared to "breach" their amnesia, they were actually consistent in their roleplaying performance by persisting in their amnesia for the hypnotic events. That simulators reported any recall at all on the second test is somewhat counterexpectational and may relate to the fact that simulators might well have felt that they could not realistically deny that those events had occurred (since they viewed them on a videotape) but felt they could nevertheless act consistently with the cues for amnesia maintenance by attributing their recall in the way that they did.
Hypnotic amnesic subjects who breached their amnesia may have used cues from the videotape to retrieve the hypnotic material. Alternatively, they may have been recalling from the videotape, and there was evidence of confusion among some hypnotic subjects as to whether their recall came from viewing the videotape or from participating in hypnotic testing. Memory can be easily influenced and distorted by subsequent material (Loftus, 1979) , and amnesic subjects knowing that an event occurred (from viewing it on a videotape) might well be unable to distinguish memories that were produced by one source (the videotape) from the same events produced by another source (the hypnotic testing). Future research clearly needs to focus closely on whether amnesic subjects viewing a videotape of actual hypnotic events are demonstrating an inability to distinguish memory sources or exhibiting a breakdown of amnesia.
Some hypnotic, but no simulating, amnesic subjects reported a memory for behavioral, but not experiential, hypnotic events when confronted with the videotape. This result replicates previous findings (McConkey et al., 1980) , and the use of the simulation condition importantly indicates that the distinction between behavioral and experiential recall cannot be attributed to the influence of the cue demands of the overall test situation. It should be acknowledged, however, that the simulators' failure to comment on a behavioral versus experiential difference in their recall of the hypnotic session may relate to the fact that simulators reported very little recall for the hypnotic session itself (recall largely being attributed to the viewing of the videotape) and, in this respect, simulators may have felt they were only in a position to make behavioral, and not experiential, comment.
The subjective reports of the real hypnotic amnesic subjects concerning behavioral versus experiential recall may relate either to cognitive process features of hypnotic amnesia itself or illustrate other cognitive features of response arising more directly from the confrontation of the amnesia via the viewing of the videotape. According to the first possibility, for hypnotic subjects the cognitive dissonance produced by viewing events for which they are amnesic (and yet that clearly occurred) may have produced a dissociation between the actual experience and the behavioral event. This process may well parallel the process of dissociation reported by others in relation to phenomena such as source amnesia (Evans, 1979) , hypnotic analgesia (Hilgard & Hilgard, 1975) , and trance logic (Orne, 1959) ; the argument being that there are aspects of the hypnotic subject's experience that are split off from conscious awareness and that illustrate the existence of complex systems of cognitive control.
Alternatively, the observed difference between behavioral and experiential recall may be related to the nature of encoding events. Analogous to the fact that viewing home movies does not necessarily recreate the feelings experienced when being photographed, behavior shown by a videotape can be said to stand apart from the experiences one may infer from the viewing of that behavior. When subjects encoded their experiences during hypnosis, they would not have encoded them as a videotape would, and consequently, the fact that they reported differences between remembering the events and how those events felt may have more to do with differences between the way people view events that have happened and the way they are encoded in the first instance-analogous perhaps to the difference existing when you hear your voice on a tape recorder; you know it is yourself but it does not sound like you.
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Demonstration of the fact that some hypnotic subjects were not able to comment on their experiences, although they acknowledged their behavior as they saw it on the screen, also raises other issues pertaining to the overall relationship between behavioral performance and experiential involvement in hypnosis. Different retrieval mechanisms for behavioral and experiential events may be implicated, for example, and the distinction that is apparent may also relate to that made in the memory literature between episodic and semantic memories (Tulving, 1972) . The phenomenon at issue in the study is that some hypnotic subjects were clearly able to recognize their behavior, but this did not necessarily facilitate the recall of their experience, and future research needs to carefully delineate whether this is the result of the paradigm of the present study or reflects distinctive cognitive mechanisms underlying posthypnotic amnesia itself.
In summary, the present study demonstrated the important finding that posthypnotic amnesia cannot be broken down in all hypnotic subjects by showing them their actual hypnotic performance and the lack of breakdown for some subjects is not based on ambiguities in the amnesia instruction. Hypnotic and simulating subjects responded similarly in terms of the number of events recalled after the viewing of the videotape but attributed their recall to different sources. Also, some hypnotic amnesic subjects reported an inability to recall experiential aspects of their hypnotic performance, whereas no simulator reported similarly. Further analysis is needed of hypnotic amnesic subjects' performance and experiences during attempts to breach their posthypnotic amnesia, and the complexities that are involved and highlighted by this study provide fertile ground for future hypothesis testing. Present data indicate that research in the field might well focus on the differentiation of experiential involvement and its behavioral components as a way of clarifying the actual mechanisms that underlie posthypnotic amnesia.
